The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project on Thursday, February 19, urged the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Maitama, to dismiss the alleged N5bn defamation suit filed against it by officials of the Department of State Services.
Adopting its final written address before Justice Yusuf Halilu, SERAP argued that the claimants failed to establish that the alleged defamatory publication referred to them personally.
The claimants, Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, in suit No. FCT/HC/CV/4547/24, sued SERAP and its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare, seeking N5bn in damages, N50m as legal costs, a public apology to be published on SERAP’s website and in national newspapers and aired on television stations, as well as 10 per cent annual interest on the judgment sum until fully paid.
They alleged that SERAP falsely claimed the DSS invaded its Abuja office in September 2024, an assertion they said damaged their reputations and that of the service.
At the resumed sitting, counsel to the first defendant, Victoria Bassey, adopted her client’s final written address and reply on points of law, urging the court to discountenance the suit.
She cited the Supreme Court decision in Onu v Agbese, arguing that where a plaintiff is not expressly named in an alleged defamatory publication, he must prove that reasonable persons understood the words to refer to him.
“For a plaintiff to succeed in an action for defamation, he must not only prove that the defendant published the defamatory words, but he must also identify himself as the person defamed,” she submitted.
Bassey contended that the publication in question referred broadly to the DSS as an institution and did not mention the claimants’ names, ranks or units.
“DSS is a national security agency with thousands of officers. Words directed at such a broad institutional body cannot automatically become personal defamation,” she argued.
Counsel to the second defendant, Oluwatosin Adesioye, also adopted his final written address, describing the suit as “offensive” and urging the court to dismiss it in its entirety.
He told the court that although a plaintiff need not always be named in a defamatory publication, he must plead and establish special circumstances linking him to the publication.
According to him, the claimants failed to provide particulars of any special or intrinsic facts showing that readers would reasonably associate the publication with them.
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He argued that one of the witnesses admitted during cross-examination that he only connected the publication to the claimants after being informed institutionally by the department.
“The principle of defamation is at the moment of the reader reading the publication, not after getting new facts to tie or have a linkage with the people being identified,” he submitted.
Adesioye further contended that the claimants did not plead facts to show that they were so well known within the DSS that any reference to the agency would automatically be understood to mean them.
He also addressed objections to the length of his written address, noting that although it exceeded the 10-page limit prescribed under Order 39 Rule 2 of the court rules, the provision did not stipulate a specific penalty for non-compliance. He added that the claimants’ final written address equally exceeded the maximum page limit.
Counsel to the claimants, Akinlolu Kehinde (SAN), adopted their final written address dated January 30, 2026, and urged the court to grant all the reliefs sought.
He argued that the second defendant’s written address, being 12 pages instead of the allowed 10, should be discontinued in line with the rules of court.
On the substantive issue, Kehinde submitted that the publication referred to the claimants by way of innuendo.
“The narrow issue in contention is the second ingredient of defamation, which is that the defamatory material must refer to the claimants,” he said.
He maintained that it was not necessary for the entire public to identify the claimants, provided that persons with contextual or background knowledge could reasonably link the publication to them.
In his remarks, Justice Halilu observed that final written addresses could not replace evidence already before the court.
“Addresses are meant to be another opportunity for you to come up with a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the law. You garnish it with the evidence before the court,” he said.
The judge noted that the most important consideration was the evidence led during trial and stated that the court would strive to balance the arguments presented.
He subsequently reserved judgment in the matter for a later date.