… Analyst cites limited investment, declining arms exports and recruitment of Africans into Ukraine war as constraints on Moscow’s influence
Russia’s expanding diplomatic and security engagement with African countries is facing growing economic and strategic constraints, with questions emerging over Moscow’s ability to translate political relationships into tangible benefits and dependable security partnerships across the continent.
Martin Minns, Co-Executive Producer of the Pan-Africa podcast Panel 54, said Russia’s economic contribution to Africa remained relatively small compared with those of the United States, Europe and China, while its security interventions had delivered uneven results.
He made the observations in an analysis titled Can Russia Reach the Summit of Its Ambitions in Africa?, following the third Russia-Africa Summit held in Moscow on October 28 and 29.
The summit, which was initially scheduled to take place in Libya, brought together 22 African heads of state, according to the Kremlin. Although this represented an increase from the 17 leaders who attended the second summit in St Petersburg in 2023, it was considerably below the 43 who participated in the inaugural gathering in Sochi in 2019.
The Kremlin attributed the lower attendance to what it described as “outrageous” pressure from Western countries. Minns acknowledged that the explanation might have some merit but questioned the characterisation of the alleged pressure.
He argued, however, that the more important issue was not the number of African leaders present but what their countries had gained from the meetings and whether the diplomatic engagements had produced sustainable partnerships.
Economic Limitations Challenge Moscow
According to Minns, Russia’s interest in Africa is driven by its ambition to counter Western influence, build partnerships with countries seeking alternatives to traditional global powers, secure access to mineral resources and expand its defence exports.
However, he identified limited investment, declining arms exports and the financial and military demands of Russia’s overseas commitments as major obstacles to achieving those objectives.
Citing investment figures, Minns said Russian investments accounted for less than one per cent of direct investment into Africa, placing Moscow far behind major economic partners such as the United States, Europe and China.
He also pointed to a 64 per cent decline in Russia’s global arms exports between 2021 and 2025, noting that the country ranked third behind the United States and China in major arms supplies to Africa during the period.
The figures, he argued, illustrated the gap between Russia’s diplomatic ambitions and its capacity to provide the economic resources and military equipment required to sustain long-term partnerships.
Sahel Security Partnerships Under Scrutiny
Russia’s growing security involvement in the Sahel has also raised questions about the effectiveness of its partnerships with countries in the region.
Minns cited figures showing that annual deaths linked to violent extremism in the Sahel increased from an average of 927 between 2016 and 2019 to 10,470 between 2022 and 2025.
He said the rising death toll raised concerns about the extent to which Russia’s security engagements had delivered reliable protection and improved stability.
The analyst also pointed to the demands of the war in Ukraine, arguing that the conflict had placed considerable pressure on Russia’s military and diplomatic resources and constrained its ability to meet commitments elsewhere.
Minns cited estimates of more than 1.2 million casualties associated with the conflict, describing the scale of the war as a major strain on Moscow’s capacity to sustain military involvement outside Europe.
Recruitment Of Africans Raises Concerns
Another issue identified by Minns was the recruitment of African nationals into the Russian military to fight in Ukraine, a development he said was damaging Moscow’s image in parts of the continent.
Citing a 2024–2025 Afrobarometer survey conducted across 38 African countries, he said perceptions of Russian influence were less favourable than those of the United States, the European Union and China.
The survey also found that 72 per cent of respondents who had heard about the Russia-Ukraine war wanted their countries to remain neutral in the conflict.
Minns further referenced an October 2026 report by the Hague-based organisation Journalists for Justice, titled The Death Contract: How Russia Recruits Africans to Fight and Die in Ukraine.
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The report documented 3,034 African citizens from 40 countries who were recruited into the Russian armed forces, often allegedly through deception and promises of civilian employment.
The recruitment concerns have prompted some African governments to seek assurances from Moscow and pursue arrangements to protect their citizens.
At the third Russia-Africa Summit, Kenyan President William Ruto secured an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin to designate Kenya a non-source country for recruitment into the Russian military.
Ruto also announced the appointment of a defence attaché at Kenya’s embassy in Moscow to coordinate the repatriation and compensation of Kenyans recruited for military purposes.
Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama similarly raised the recruitment of Ghanaian nationals with Putin.
Following the engagement, Ghana’s Foreign Ministry announced that the Russian president had declared that Ghanaians would no longer be allowed to participate in the war with Ukraine, including through voluntary enlistment.
Minns described the agreements as welcome developments but cautioned that their effectiveness would depend on implementation and the ability of African governments to prevent recruiters from exploiting alternative channels.
He also cited Bloomberg reports indicating that Moscow was expanding its recruitment activities into other African countries, including Zimbabwe, Burundi and Sierra Leone.
African States Pursue Diversified Partnerships
Beyond the recruitment controversy, Minns described Africa’s broader engagement with Russia as an expression of what he called “diversified non-alignment”.
Under this approach, African governments increasingly view Moscow as one of several international partners through which they can pursue their economic, security and diplomatic interests, rather than as an exclusive strategic ally.
He said countries across the continent were seeking opportunities to expand trade, strengthen security cooperation and secure greater representation in international institutions while maintaining relationships with other global powers.
This approach, according to Minns, reflects the interest of African governments in preserving their strategic independence and widening their international options.
He argued that Russia’s limitations in trade, arms supplies and diplomatic influence, particularly amid the continuing war in Ukraine, raised questions about its ability to convert political declarations into concrete commitments.
The analyst maintained that the real measure of the Moscow summit would be the extent to which the agreements reached translated into measurable benefits for African countries.
He said Russia’s future standing on the continent would depend on its ability to deliver sustained economic opportunities, dependable security partnerships and tangible development outcomes.
“A summit in Moscow gives some idea as to the scale of Russia’s ambitions; it’s what follows that will reveal how far it can realistically meet them,” Minns said, adding: “As they say: talk is cheap.”