Former Inspector-General of Police, Sir Mike Mbama Okiro, delivered the lead paper at the panel session of the First Daily Sixth Anniversary National Public Lecture and National Dialogue on Security, held on Tuesday, July 28, 2026, at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja. In his presentation, titled “Declaration of a State of Emergency on Insecurity: Matching Words with Action,” the retired police chief examined Nigeria’s worsening security crisis, the constitutional framework for emergency declarations, and the practical steps required to translate government pronouncements into measurable improvements in security. Below is the full text of his paper.
DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY ON INSECURITY: MATCHING WORDS WITH ACTION
Being a Paper Delivered by Sir Mike Mbama Okiro as the Lead Speaker of the Panel Session on the Occasion of the 6th Anniversary Annual National Public Lecture of First Daily Online Newspaper held on Tuesday, July 28th, 2026 at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja, Nigeria
PROTOCOL
Nigeria is currently enmeshed in what many scholars grimly refer to today as a “polycrisis of insecurity.” Taking the North-East, Nigeria, as our departure point, protracted conflict and high levels of violence orchestrated by the Boko Haram, and later the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorist groups, pose phenomenal challenges to lives and means of livelihood. Studies indicate that since 2009, when Boko Haram ignited the violence, the ongoing conflict has devastated agricultural livelihoods in various ways (livestock losses, reduced access to fishing grounds, destruction of irrigation and farming facilities, and the collapse of extension services and key agriculture-based value chains).
Additional losses arise from levies imposed by Boko Haram on the transportation of goods, market and trade facilities. Reduced production due to mass displacement and limited access to markets also complicate the precarious situation.
A combination of factors has been blamed for the violence in the North-East. The North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA), for example, points at social, political, economic and environmental drivers as behind the crisis. Other contributors include weak governance systems which hinder effective responses to both conflict and displacement. Limited government support, poor management and limited access to new technologies and inputs accelerated the erosion of rural livelihoods in agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries; while the lack of employment and livelihood opportunities is considered a possible push factor towards violence, particularly for young people.
Studies say Borno State in particular has faced escalating levels of insecurity leading to massive population movements and food insecurity, in addition to human, social and economic losses. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that Borno State is the most affected by conflict-related displacements in Nigeria, with 2020-2022 figures showing that out of a total of 2,118,550 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 1,566,011 of them (representing 74 percent) were located in Borno State.
Trailing the spectacle in the North-East, with very similar consequences, are widespread banditry and kidnapping in virtually all states of the federation, but more pronounced in some North-West states. The South-East is held down by unknown gunmen, amidst violent secessionist agitations, while the Middle-Belt grapples with farmer-herder clashes and communal violence. In the South-South and South-West axis, cultism, kidnapping, restiveness and oil infrastructure attacks and sabotage are rife, leading to the loss of billions of naira in oil revenue annually.
In the South-South oil-producing communities, for instance, oil pollution has devastated the region’s fresh water sources, air quality, vegetation, and public health. Protests against perceivable underdevelopment, poverty, inequalities, and forceful migration lead to recurring violent conflicts between the government and restive militants/aggrieved communities. The cumulative results of all the raging violence have been reckless killings, displacement of whole communities, burning of villages, collapse of rural economies, and a general climate of fear. This is, indeed, a sad commentary.
In response to the profound threshold of insecurity across the country, civil society groups, traditional rulers, governors, and ordinary citizens in their numbers called for the “declaration of a State of Emergency on Insecurity.” Consequently, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, on Wednesday November 26, 2025, declared a nationwide security emergency in order to tackle escalating banditry, terrorism, and mass abductions across Nigeria. The development followed intensified insecurity nationwide, involving among others, the mass kidnappings of 25 school girls, 38 worshippers, 315 school children and teachers within one week. With the declaration came a presidential order for the recruitment of additional members of the armed forces, 20,000 additional policemen, the utilization of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) camps for temporary police training, the deployment of Department of State Services (DSS)-trained forest guards, and federal backing for the establishment of state police, et cetera.
A cursory look at the history of state of emergency declarations in the country since 1960, when the country gained independence, shows that the first was in 1962, when the then Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, declared a state of emergency in the defunct Western Region in response to severe political crisis within the Action Group (AG). The internal feud between Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola resulted in violent clashes, legislative chaos, and widespread destruction. The region was placed under emergency rule, and Dr. Moses Majekodunmi was appointed as the administrator.
The next experience was on May 18, 2004, when former President Olusegun Obasanjo imposed a state of emergency on Plateau State and suspended the elected governor, Joshua Dariye, and the State House of Assembly. The governor was accused of failing to act to end a vicious cycle of violence between the Muslim and Christian communities in the state that claimed over 2,000 lives beginning from September 2001. Major General Chris Alli (rtd.) was appointed as the administrator of the state.
Obasanjo again imposed emergency rule on Ekiti State in 2006, and appointed Brigadier General Adetunji Olurin (rtd.) as administrator, following political violence that led to widespread unrest and the breakdown of governance when then Governor Ayo Fayose was impeached under controversial circumstances.
On December 31, 2011, former President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in some Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno State, as well as some LGAs in Plateau State in response to Boko Haram attacks and communal conflicts, respectively. Jonathan, between 2013 and 2014, declared a State of Emergency in the three North-East states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, when Boko Haram violence and kidnappings intensified.
Following protracted political crisis in Rivers State, President Bola Tinubu on March 18, 2025, also declared a State of Emergency in Rivers State, suspended Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his deputy Ngozi Odu, and all the members of the House of Assembly for six months, and appointed Vice Admiral Ibokette Ibas (rtd.) to administer the state for the emergency period. The November 26, 2025 national emergency declaration on security brings to two the number of such declarations under President Tinubu’s administration.
However, the question is not just whether to declare a State of Emergency on Insecurity. It would seem the deeper question is: If we declare it, can we match words with decisive, lawful, and effective action?
By the end of this talk, we will endeavour to:
1. Define what a “State of Emergency” means under Nigerian law.
2. Diagnose the current insecurity landscape.
3. Examine arguments for and against a declaration.
4. Propose a framework for “matching words with action.”
5. Discuss lessons from past emergencies in Nigeria.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) provides for the declaration of a State of Emergency under such conditions as: war, external aggression, breakdown of public order, natural disaster, or “such other public danger.”
The key provisions stipulate that the President may issue a proclamation, published in the Official Gazette; that approval must be given by two-thirds majority of each House of the National Assembly (NASS) within two days if NASS is in session, or within ten days if not; and that the initial duration of such emergency is six months, renewable by NASS.
Nevertheless, such a declaration cannot suspend Sections 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41, which guarantee the rights to life, dignity, liberty, fair hearing, privacy, freedom of thought, expression, association and movement, except to the extent reasonably justifiable.
Therefore, a “State of Emergency on Insecurity” is not martial law. It is a constitutional tool to temporarily centralize powers, mobilize resources, and suspend some administrative bottlenecks to restore order.
A penetrating diagnosis of the insecurity crisis in the country will reveal data and realities which include the following:
* Over 15 years of insurgency, thousands dead, more than two million (2m) people in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps.
* Widespread banditry and violence evident in the North West and North Central axis – mass abductions of school children, kidnappings, ransoms paid in billions of naira, and control of highways and forests by gun-toting bandits.
* Violent attacks, kidnappings for ransom and killings by “unknown gunmen” in the South-East, with police stations, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) offices, community leaders and ordinary citizens as targets.
* Kidnapping turned to a thriving national industry with highways in South-West and North-Central as major hotspots.
* Violent communal/farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt, leading to massive killings, burning of villages and farms, and en masse human displacements.
* Oil militancy, violence and killings, sabotage, piracy and kidnappings across South-South/South-West upland and waterways.
The consequences cut through the economic, social and political challenges, such as abandoned farms, food inflation, scaring away of investors, social trauma, rising numbers of out-of-school children, and the collapse of citizens’ trust in the state, including the ceding governance to non-state actors in some of the Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the country under siege.
Does the situation warrant the declaration of a State of Emergency on Insecurity? For many Nigerians, the answer is yes, the reason being that the threats are no longer perceived as ordinary crime, but are tilting towards a calculated and possibly contrived mischief to disrupt the leadership and continued existence of the Nigerian state as presently known.
Therefore, strident calls for the declaration of a State of Emergency on Insecurity in the country seem not out of place. The proponents have their reasons. For, they consider the following:
1. Unity of Command
Currently, security response is fragmented across the Nigerian Army, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Department of State Services (DSS), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and diverse vigilante formations. Emergency allows a joint command.
2. Resource Mobilization
The state can quickly mobilize funds to fast-track the procurement of weapons, drones, intelligence tools without bureaucratic rigours.
3. Legal Cover
Emergency confers on the state powers to legally impose curfews, restriction of movement, and search without warrant in designated areas.
4. Boosting Citizens’ Trust in the State
Emergency instills confidence and trust in citizens that the state is showing concern about the gravity of insecurity. It also sends signals to perpetrators of insecurity that the state is fully out to do battle with them.
5. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
A State of Emergency also implies that the state is ready to raise emergency funds for taking good care of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and for rebuilding the ruins left behind by pervasive insecurity.
But referencing the State of Emergency on Insecurity declared by former President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013 in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, can it be honestly stated that the intervention brought Boko Haram insurgency to an end?
The answer is a capital No.
At best, the measure temporarily disrupted the group’s operations.
This brings us to the arguments being advanced by the antagonists of the declaration of a State of Emergency on Insecurity. The opponents argue as follows:
1. Abuse of Power
Emergency powers can be used to target political opponents.
2. Militarization, Use of Excessive Force and Rights Violations
Emergency may exacerbate the use of brute force on civilians, extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses.
3. Federalism Concerns
State governors may see it as encroachment on state security roles by the government at the centre.
4. Neglect of Root Causes and Failed Precedent
The woeful failure of the State of Emergency declared in 2013 by President Jonathan to arrest the situation, as well as failure of the state to decisively address the root causes, such as mass poverty and youth unemployment, marginalization, inequality, suffering and frustration in the land. Indeed, youth unemployment became a time bomb waiting to explode right from the early days of the Fourth Republic.
5. Economic Impact
The imposition of curfews and lockdowns, for example, will hurt poor traders and farmers the more, since they live by their daily toil.
Then the core question:
Is insecurity a failure of the law, or a failure of political will, intelligence, and governance?
My guess is that many will vote for the latter.
Again, if the right answer is the latter, a failure of political will, intelligence and governance, can emergency alone resolve the conundrum?
MATCHING WORDS WITH ACTION
Political will is the pillar of matching words with action, especially when the declaration of a State of Emergency is pronounced. Sadly, words without action have been defining Nigeria’s security discourse for so long.
Provided the requisite political will has been mustered, matching words with action can be translated as follows, among others:
1. Presidential Ownership
The President must chair weekly National Security Council meetings personally, not through delegation.
2. End Impunity
Prosecute all proven sponsors of banditry, terrorism and kidnapping, no matter how highly placed.
3. Inter-Agency Cooperation
End rivalry between the Nigerian Army, NPF, DSS and others, and establish one central intelligence fusion centre.
4. Federal-State Alignment of Security Responsibilities
Governors must be partners in security provisioning, not spectators. The ongoing State Police proposal must be concluded without compromising the honest outcomes.
If a State of Emergency on Insecurity is declared without the President personally driving it on a daily basis, it becomes another press statement or a decoy.
OPERATIONAL MILITARY AND SECURITY ACTION THAT WINS
The operational military and security actions that can douse the flame will include the following:
1. Defining Clear Objectives
The clarity of objectives matters. I recommend objectives that focus on “clear, hold, and build,” not just intermittent raids. Ungoverned spaces need to be taken back, occupied, governed and rebuilt.
2. Technology and Intelligence
Drones, satellite imagery, phone tracking and community informants must be taken seriously and generously funded. Nigeria cannot fight 21st century bandits with 20th century tools.
3. The Welfare of Troops
Better pay, equipment, medical care, and rotation of troops’ deployment to avoid burnout, etc.
4. Police Reform
There is this popular saying that 80% of insecurity is internal security. Nigeria deserves and presently needs a well-funded, well-trained and well-equipped community policing model.
5. Border Control
The country’s porous borders with Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin are fueling the influx of arms and fighters from foreign lands into Nigeria, and must be placed under strict restrictions.
The success or the contrary of all of these actions must be measured against the indexes of communities reclaimed and rebuilt, schools reopened, safety of highways and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) returned to their natural homes.
NON-KINETIC ACTION
As has been widely acclaimed, Nigeria cannot wriggle out of this insecurity crisis through killings alone. Some non-kinetic actions, bordering on governance, justice and development are absolutely necessary as well. They include the following:
1. Addressing the Root Causes
Poverty, unemployment and illiteracy are some of the purveyors of insecurity. These realities readily provide the pools from where criminals, bandits and terrorists are recruited, though the spread and variants of the root causes might be higher in some domains than others.
2. Justice
Court proceedings need to be fast-tracked for kidnappers and terrorists such that victims can see and feel the rendition of justice.
3. Community Engagement
Certified traditional rulers, credible religious leaders and vigilante entities should be formalized and funded.
4. Deradicalization, alongside Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
Deradicalization, alongside Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) for truly repentant fighters should be encouraged, against the backdrop, however, that amnesty without follow-up fails over time.
5. Economic Recovery
The safety of farm-to-market roads should be guaranteed, irrigation should be accorded priority, and ranching policy properly clarified to reduce farmer-herder conflicts.
READ ALSO: Beyond Bullets And Bandits: Why Nigeria’s Security Crisis Requires A New National Strategy
ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Recourse to legality and legitimacy is the hallmark of democratic governance, and the declaration of a State of Emergency cannot subtract from this acclaimed fact. Therefore, the following also apply:
1. Parliamentary Oversight
The National Assembly (NASS) must not be a mere rubber stamp. It should carry out a quarterly review of the intervention.
2. Role of Civil Society
The civil society owes the nation and citizens the duty of monitoring rights abuses, while the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) must have access to detention centres.
3. Communication Strategy
The government must open up to Nigerians by being truthful on what is being done, where, and the results.
4. Sunset Clause
Emergency must have exit benchmarks. It must not become permanent in order to avoid the temptation of drifting into dictatorship.
5. International Law
Even in emergency, Nigeria is bound by the Geneva Conventions and other human rights treaties. Care should be taken to avoid the trap of committing crimes against humanity using a State of Emergency to disguise.
CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD
Insecurity in Nigeria has become phenomenal and existential. A State of Emergency may be a necessary tool, but it is not sufficient and cannot win alone. The contemplation or actual declaration of such intervention demands iron cast political will, operational capacity, governance reform, accountability and concrete positive outcomes. Against the foregoing background, the following recommendations have become necessary.
1. To conduct a National Security Audit before any declaration to know gaps.
2. If declared, to limit the emergency geographically to worst-hit zones first and not making it blanket.
3. To pair the emergency declaration with a 2-year “National Security and Reconstruction Plan” with appropriate budget.
4. Involve citizens. The phrase: “See something, say something” must be real, not a mere slogan.
5. The intervention needs to be reviewed every 90 days for result assessment; and strategies/leadership changed if outcomes are not impressive enough.
Nigerians are tired of rhetoric. They want to go to farm without fear, travel on highways without fear, and send children to school without fear.
The declaration of a State of Emergency is easy. But the hard and honorable part is “matching the words with action.”
The legitimacy of the Nigerian state in the 21st century will be decided not by what we say in Abuja, but by what a mother in Zamfara, a trader in Imo, and a farmer in Benue experience tomorrow.
For, emergency without development is just a longer curfew; the same way a state that defeats bandits but loses its soul has not won the battle.
I thank you all, and please note that I am open to questions, if any.
Sir (Dr.) Mike Mbama Okiro
IGP (Rtd.), CFR, NPM, mni, KSS, DSI